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Since Pickering v. Board of Education'-the seminal case on
public employment-free speech jurisprudence-the United States
Supreme Court and the various federal circuit courts of appeals
have struggled to navigate and clarify the nuances of the
Pickering balancing test. This test requires the balancing of the
employee's free speech rights against the public employer's inter-
est in operational efficiency in employment retaliation cases.
In this article, I will first examine some of the cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court dealing with the free speech
rights of public employees, including teachers, who criticize their
employers. As renowned constitutional law scholar Gerald Gun-
ther notes, in interpreting and applying balancing tests, "the sin-
gle most important trait for responsible balancing [is] the capacity
to identify ... each analytically distinct ingredient of the contend-
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reviewers, editors, and editorial board members of the Duquesne Law Review for their
excellent work.
1. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
133
Duquesne Law Review
ing interests."2 In this article, I will attempt to highlight the vari-
ous approaches utilized by the circuit courts of appeals to identify
a framework for applying the Pickering balancing test and the in-
gredients of the contending interests under the test--employees'
free speech rights and employers' operational efficiency.
The review will reveal inconsistencies in the approaches of the
circuit courts of appeals. To provide greater consistency in the
framework and application of the Pickering balancing test across
circuits, I conclude this article with a framework that should re-
flect greater harmony with the United States Supreme Court's
intent with respect to Pickering and its progeny.
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE-FREE SPEECH
Pickering v. Board of Education3 is the first case in which the
United States Supreme Court defined the scope of public employ-
ees' free speech rights. In that case, Marvin Pickering, a public
school teacher, was terminated by a local school board for criticiz-
ing his employers in a letter to a local newspaper. 4 The school
board had put a proposal on the ballot to raise funds through bond
issues to build new schools, and proposed a tax rate hike for edu-
cational purposes.5 The voters rejected both proposals. 6 Prior to
the voting date on one of the proposals, a number of articles by the
teachers' union and one by the superintendent were published in
the local paper petitioning voters to support the proposal in order
to avoid a deterioration of education in the school district.7 Seek-
ing to be part of the conversation about the funding initiatives,
Pickering wrote a letter to the newspaper, critiquing, inter alia,
the board and the superintendent for their handling of the various
proposals to raise revenues for the schools and the allocation of
school finances to athletics over education.8 The board terminated
Pickering, citing his writing and publication of the letter in justifi-
2. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
4. Id. at 564.
5. Id. at 565-66.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 566.
8. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
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cation.9 Pickering challenged his termination as a violation of his
First Amendment right to free speech. 10
The Illinois state courts rejected his free speech claim, stating
that, even though as a citizen he would have the right of free
speech under the facts of the case, as a public school teacher he
was obligated not to speak out about the operation of his school."
The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed with
Pickering. 12 Specifically, the Court held that the Constitution
does not allow public school teachers to be coerced into giving up
free speech rights to which they are entitled as citizens in speak-
ing out on matters of public interest involving the operation of the
schools where they work. 13
The Supreme Court then laid out what has since become known
as the Pickering balancing test for adjudicating public employees'
claims that their termination or other disciplinary action against
them violates their free speech rights. As stated by the Supreme
Court, the Pickering balancing test provides: "The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees."'14 A dia-
grammatic representation of aspects of the Pickering balancing
test can be found at the end of this article.
The Court identified certain general factors or ingredients to be
considered in applying the test; these factors are known as the
Pickering calculus factors. They include: (a) whether the speech
would impact harmony among coworkers or the employee's imme-
diate superior's ability to maintain discipline; 15 (b) whether the
speech is directed toward someone with whom the employee would
typically be in contact during his daily work; 16 (c) whether the na-
ture of the employment relationship between the employee and
the person toward whom the speech is directed is so close that
personal loyalty and confidence are critical to their proper func-
tioning; 17 (d) whether the employee's speech (which may be false)
9. Id. at 566-67.
10. Id. at 565.
11. Id. at 567.
12. Id. at 574-75.
13. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 569-70.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 570.
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was based on inside information accessible to the employee;18 (e)
flexibility for employers to terminate an employee whose speech
hampers the effective performance of such an employee; 19 (f) the
employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern
and the public's interest in free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance;20 (g) the fact that public employees are more
likely than the general citizenry to have informed and definite
opinions about the matter in question;2' (h) the ease with which
the employer could rebut the content of the employee's statement
if false;22 and (i) whether there is evidence that the speech actu-
ally had an adverse impact on the employer's proper functioning. 23
Even though some of Pickering's statements turned out to be
false, such as his accusation that too much funding was devoted to
athletics at the expense of education, 24 the Court characterized his
ostensibly false statements as "a mere difference of opinion" about
the best way to operate the school district. 25 Furthermore, "ab-
sent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by
him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment." 26 Additionally, the Court held that the board could
have easily rebutted Pickering's statements by sending a letter to
the same or another newspaper 27 and that Pickering had no
greater access to accurate information than did the board.28 The
Court assumed, without explaining, that the funding of the school
district was an issue of public interest and, consequently, an issue
entitled to free and open debate in order to ensure informed deci-
sion-making by the citizenry.29
Nine years later, in Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle,30 the Court attempted to further define the
parameters of the Pickering balancing test. In this case, Fred
Doyle, a public school teacher, called a radio station to disclose a
18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
19. Id. at 573.
20. Id. at 572-73.
21. Id. at 572.
22. Id.
23. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-71. The Court made various references to "no evidence,"
affirming that mere speculation was not adequate. Id.
24. Id. at 572.
25. Id. at 571.
26. Id. at 574.
27. Id. at 572.
28. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
29. Id. at 571-72.
30. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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memorandum from his principal to teachers instituting a manda-
tory dress code for teachers. 31 The dress code was adopted be-
cause some of the administrators believed that teacher appear-
ance was related to public support for bond issues.32 Following
the radio broadcast, the board decided not to rehire Doyle. 33
Doyle's background at the school prior to the radio station inci-
dent included engaging in an altercation with a colleague, 34
swearing at students in relation to a disciplinary complaint, 35 and
making obscene gestures to female students who failed to obey
him. 36 These incidents, in addition to the speech to the radio sta-
tion, were cited by the board in justification of Doyle's nonre-
newal.3 7 Doyle challenged the board's decision not to rehire him
as a violation of his constitutional right to free speech.
38
Mount Healthy was the first case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the role of "mixed motives" in the Pickering balancing
test. 'Mixed motives" arise in cases where a public employer ter-
minates an employee ostensibly for the employee's speech, yet
other potential justifications exist for terminating the employee.
In such cases, courts then have to sort out the actual motives of
the employer from the pretextual. Essentially, "mixed motives"
analysis involves an attempt to determine cause and effect: what
was the actual cause of the employee's termination? Doyle's back-
ground, coupled with his communication to the radio station, pre-
sented "mixed motives" for his termination.3 9 While agreeing with
Doyle that his communication to the radio station was constitu-
tionally protected, the Court, as a result of its "mixed motives"
analysis, refused to order his reinstatement. 40
In its effort to resolve intricacies of the "mixed motives" aspect
of the Pickering balancing test analysis, the Court decided that a
burden-of-proof allocation between the parties in public employ-
ment-free speech cases would provide greater clarity for the judi-
ciary. 41 This allocation of the burden is as follows:
31. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 281.
35. Id. at 281-82.
36. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
37. Id. at 282-83.
38. Id. at 276.
39. Id. at 285.
40. Id.
41. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. The entire Mount Healthy "mixed motives"
framework is sometimes referred to as the "balance of burdens." See Price Waterhouse v.
Winter 2008
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1. The initial burden of proof in public employment-free
speech cases is on the employee to show that: (a) his or her con-
duct is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 and
(b) the conduct was "a substantial factor" or a "motivating factor"
in the employer's decision to terminate or not rehire him or her.
The "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" language repre-
sents the Court's causation test in "mixed motives" analysis.
43 If
the employee is unable to carry this burden, the constitutional
question is to be resolved in favor of the employer.
44
2. After the employee successfully carries the burden of proof,
the employer must then show by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision about the employee's
termination or nonrenewal had the employee not engaged in the
protected speech. 45 This is the "same decision anyway" defense in
the burden-of-proof allocation in "mixed motives" analysis, an af-
firmative defense for employers.
46
Pickering and Mount Healthy involved employee speech in pub-
lic forums. 47 In Pickering, the employee speech was a letter sent
to a local newspaper, 48 and in Mount Healthy it was communica-
tion with a radio station.49 The Court had never decided if private
communications between employers and employees or employer-
employee communications in private forums were entitled to First
Amendment protection. The Court finally made this determina-
tion two years after Mount Healthy, in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District.50 Bessie Givhan, a public school
teacher, was terminated for complaining to her principal about
policies and practices of the school district which she perceived to
be discriminatory in purpose and effect. 51 At the time of her ter-
mination, the school district was under a desegregation order.
52
Givhan intervened in the desegregation action, challenging her
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist.
205, 17 F.3d 1059, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).




46. The Mount Healthy "same decision anyway" defense is also known as the Mount
Healthy defense.
47. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564; Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274.
48. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
49. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
50. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
51. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13.
52. Id. at 411.
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termination as a violation of her First Amendment free speech
right.53 The Court held that
[t]he First Amendment forbids abridgement of the freedom of
speech. Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indi-
cate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who ar-
ranges to communicate privately with his employer rather
than to spread his views before the public. We decline to
adopt such a view of the First Amendment. 54
Givhan thus established that employees who criticize their em-
ployers in private communications or settings are entitled to First
Amendment protection. The scope of the protection, however, is
dependent on a Pickering balancing test analysis in the pertinent
case. 5
5
In 1983, in Connick v. Myers,56 the Court attempted to give sub-
stance to the "matter of public concern" portion of the Pickering
balancing test. Connick was the first case in which the United
States Supreme Court applied the Pickering balancing test to pub-
lic employees other than teachers. In Connick, Sheila Myers, an
Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, was terminated after
she prepared and distributed to her coworkers a questionnaire
soliciting their opinions about office morale, the need for a griev-
ance committee, the office transfer policy, their level of confidence
in supervisors, and pressures to work in political campaigns.
57
Myers prepared the questionnaire after she was advised that
she was being transferred to another section of the criminal court.
She expressed her objections to her supervisors and the District
Attorney. 58 They urged Myers to accept the transfer but she re-
fused. 59 Following discussions with the first assistant district at-
torney, Myers developed the questionnaire. 60 The District Attor-
ney then terminated Myers, 61 citing the following in justification:
insubordination by distributing the questionnaire and refusal to
53. Id. at 411-12.
54. Id. at 415-16.
55. See id. at 410.
56. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
57. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
58. Id.





accept the transfer. 62 Myers challenged her termination as a vio-
lation of her First Amendment freedom of speech rights.63
The Court established that, as a threshold issue, before the
Pickering balancing test is applied in any case, a determination
must be made as to whether the subject matter of the speech is
merely an employment dispute or a matter of public concern. 64 If
the matter is merely an employment dispute, deference is given to
the employer's termination decision, unless some statutory or con-
stitutional ground, other than the First Amendment, is pre-
sented. 65 If, however, the speech is a matter of public concern,
then-and only then-is the Pickering balancing test triggered. 66
In Connick, the Court revealed the test for determining whether
public employee speech constitutes speech on a matter of public
concern: '"Vhether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and con-
text of a given statement. ' 67 The content, form, and context of the
statement must be examined to determine whether the employee
speech "relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community."68 This test (also known as the Connick test) is
Connick's contribution to the development of the Court's public
employment-free speech jurisprudence. However, the Court failed
to define the parameters of content, form, or context.
With respect to speech that does not constitute a matter of pub-
lic concern pursuant to the test above, the Supreme Court held:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon mat-
ters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon mat-
ters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual cir-
cumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a
public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behav-
ior. 6
9
Besides, the Court added, "[w]hile as a matter of good judgment,
public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered
by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a pub-
62. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 146-47.
65. Id.; see also id. at 146, 147, 151-52.
66. Id. at 146-47.
67. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 147.
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lic office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over
internal office affairs."
70
The Supreme Court found that only one of Myers' questions to
her coworkers, the question about pressures to work on political
campaigns, constituted a matter of public concern. 71 Its reason-
ing, consequent to application of the Connick test, relied on the
fact that speech about political pressure to work in campaigns
might reveal unconstitutional official coercion of belief and embod-
ies the historical value this country places on government em-
ployment being a function of meritorious, rather than political,
service. 72 The Court found the other questions to be mere exten-
sions of Myers' employment dispute with her employer. 73
In what is ostensibly a countermand of one of the Pickering cal-
culus factors, the Court held: "[w]e do not see the necessity for an
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disrup-
tion of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action." 74  In Pickering, that factor re-
quired public employers to provide evidence demonstrating that
the employee's speech actually had an adverse impact on the em-
ployer's proper functioning; the Court made clear in Pickering that
conjecture would not suffice. 75
The latest Supreme Court case dealing with the free speech
rights of public employees who criticize their employers is Garcetti
v. Ceballos.76 In this case, Richard Ceballos, a supervisory deputy
district attorney, claimed that his employer subjected him to sev-
eral retaliatory employment actions following the exercise of his
right to free speech.77
The incidents that formed the basis of the action arose after a
defense attorney asked Ceballos to review a pending criminal case
and an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in the case be-
cause the affidavit contained inaccuracies. 78 After his investiga-
tion, Ceballos concluded that the affidavit contained serious mis-
representations. Ceballos discussed his concerns about the affida-
vit, criticized the handling of the case, and recommended dis-
70. Id. at 149.
71. Id. at 148-49.
72. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
73. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 152.
75. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-71.
76. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
77. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
78. Id. at 1955.
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missal in a disposition memorandum presented to one of his su-
pervisors. 79 The supervisor refused to dismiss the case.
80
Ceballos alleged that the retaliatory employment actions began
after all these incidents transpired and were based on his speech
in the memorandum. 8' The actions which he challenged as a vio-
lation of his First Amendment right included: reassignment from
his position as calendar deputy to a trial deputy position, denial of
a promotion, and transfer to a different courthouse. 82 Ceballos'
supervisors denied taking any retaliatory actions against him,
contending that these actions were not retaliatory but rather
based on staffing needs.8 3 In the alternative, the supervisors al-
leged that the memorandum was not protected speech. 84
Garcetti required the Court to clarify what it means to speak "as
a citizen" versus "as an employee" under the Pickering balancing
test. In Pickering, the Court noted that the balancing test only
applies to an employee who speaks as a citizen on a matter of pub-
lic concern. The test for determining whether employee speech
was made "as a citizen" versus "as an employee" provides: "when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official du-
ties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their com-
munications from employer discipline. '8 5 This is the "pursuant to
official duties" test, or the Garcetti test, and it is the most impor-
tant contribution of the Garcetti case to the Court's public em-
ployment-free speech jurisprudence.
Indicating how the Garcetti test will play out in its application,
the Court noted that the statements and complaints by employees
in Pickering and Connick were not made pursuant to official du-
ties, but were made outside the scope of employment duties.8 6 In
both cases, the employer did not authorize the speech, and the
employees did not speak out because it was a part of their job re-
quirement to speak out.8 7 Applying the "pursuant to official du-
ties" test, the Court stated that
79. Id. at 1955-56.
80. Id. at 1956.
81. Id.
82. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1960 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 1961.
87. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
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[t]he controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions
were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy....
That consideration-the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prose-
cutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about
how best to proceed with a pending case-distinguishes Ce-
ballos' case from those in which the First Amendment pro-
vides protection against discipline.
88
The Court reasoned that the official duties Ceballos was em-
ployed to perform in his capacity as a calendar deputy included
writing disposition memos, and that was his reason for preparing
the memo in this case.8 9 Since "Ceballos did not act as a citizen
when he went about conducting his daily professional activities,
such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and prepar-
ing filings... he did not speak as a citizen by writing a memo that
addressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal case." 90
Further, the Court noted, "[w]hen he went to work and performed
the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government
employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to
speak or write does not mean that his supervisors were prohibited
from evaluating his performance." 91
The Garcetti test could have a chilling effect on teachers, caus-
ing them not to speak out on matters of academic scholarship or
classroom teaching when such speech could be considered part of
their official duties and thus unprotected by the First Amend-
ment. The Court refused to address this, stating only that "ex-
pression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully
accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech juris-
prudence."
92
II. THE APPROACH OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS TO
PICKERING
The circuit courts of appeals have applied the Pickering balanc-
ing test since its formulation in 1968 to decide cases involving
88. Id. at 1959-60 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 1960.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
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public employee whistleblowing. This section presents some of the
highlights of the approaches used by the courts of appeals.
93
In general, as best described in a Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case, the courts of appeals usually use a three-part inquiry,
set forth below, in analyzing a public employment-free speech
case. 94 The general position of the circuit courts is that "[a] state
may not dismiss a public school teacher because of the teacher's
exercise of speech protected by the First Amendment."95 The cir-
cuit courts generally accept the principle that "[e]xcept as quali-
fied by the special exigencies of the employment relationship, pub-
lic employees retain the full panoply of first amendment rights
enjoyed by all citizens."
96
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out:
The question of whether the employee's speech is constitu-
tionally protected is a different issue from the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the employer has violated the employee's right
of freedom of speech .... [W]e [have] recognized this distinc-
tion between speech to which no constitutional right attaches
[and] speech that, while protected, is . . . outweighed by the
government's interest. 97
In addressing the rights of public employees who whistleblow,
the circuit courts of appeals generally rely on the Pickering bal-
ancing test, using a three-pronged inquiry: 98 (i) whether the
speech is about a legitimate matter of public concern; (ii) if the
speech is about a matter of public concern, whether the employee
93. The circuit courts of appeals have interpreted the "substantial factor" requirement
in the plaintiffs burden of proof set forth in Mount Healthy as a "but for" causation test
(See, e.g., Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 1994); Daulton v. Affeldt,
678 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1982)).
94. According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the order of the inquiries could
vary with the facts of a particular case. Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 689 (4th Cir.
1986). It appears that courts are not always rigid as to the order in which the inquiries
take place. See, e.g., Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984). Unless
specifically mentioned otherwise below with respect to a particular circuit court of appeals,
it should be assumed that the three-part inquiry is followed. As reflected below, some
circuit courts of appeals have had relatively more judicial activity with respect to the inter-
pretation and application of aspects of Pickering and its progeny.
95. Stroman v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1992).
96. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
97. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. See Holley v. Seminole County School District, 755 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985), for
an excellent explication of the three-pronged inquiry.
Vol. 46
Winter 2008 Pickering in the Federal Circuits
would have been dismissed "but for" the protected speech; 99 and
(iii) if the employee successfully shows that the speech was the
"but for" cause of the dismissal, whether the degree of public in-
terest in the employee's statement was nonetheless outweighed by
the employer's responsibility to manage its internal affairs and
provide "effective and efficient" service to the public. If so, then
the employer will not be liable. 100
The first step of the three-pronged inquiry determines whether
the employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment pur-
suant to the first part of the employee's burden of proof as set
forth in Mount Healthy. Whereas the first two steps of the inquiry
determine whether the employee has established a prima facie
case of constitutional protection, 10 1 the third step-the Pickering
balancing-determines whether the employer has violated the
employee's right of protected speech. 10 2  In establishing that
speech is constitutionally protected in the heritage of Pickering
and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the employee must speak "as a citizen"; 10 3 the circuit courts have
seldom applied this aspect of the Pickering balancing test in the
three-pronged inquiry, so it is difficult to determine which part of
the three-prong inquiry they will fit this requirement under.
However, as Garcetti emphasized, this is a critical part of First
99. In this step, the employee shows the causal link between the protected speech and
the retaliatory government action. It is also in this step that the employer defends itself
using the "same decision anyway" defense from Mount Healthy; the same preponderance of
the evidence burden of proof standard laid out in Mount Healthy is applicable.
100. Daniels, 801 F.2d at 690. See also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir.
2004); Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d
318 (2d Cir. 1996); Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1993); Kinsey v.
Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992); Johnsen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3 of Tulsa
County, Okla., 891 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989); Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205
(2d Cir. 1988); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1988); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989);
Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986); Ferrara, 781 F.2d
1508; Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d. 827 (1st Cir. 1985); Bowman v. Pulaski County Special
Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983); Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1983);
McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983).
101. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. 274.
102. See, e.g., Ferrara, 781 F.2d 1508; Holley, 755 F.2d 1492. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has a different approach. This circuit holds that for speech to be protected, both
the Pickering balancing test as well as the Connick test must be satisfied. After this step of
showing the speech is constitutionally protected, the next steps include the employee prov-
ing causation and finally the employer establishing the "same decision anyway" defense.
Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1986).
103. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 586 (the Pickering balancing test); Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at
1960 (the Garcetti test).
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Amendment analysis of public employment-free speech cases. 10 4
It seems, however, that since only "citizen" status and not "em-
ployee" status is protected, it is likely to fall under the first in-
quiry along with the inquiry about "matter of public concern," as
part of the employee's prima facie case. This would be consistent
with the reading of Pickering, Mount Healthy, and Garcetti, be-
cause the Supreme Court has expressly extended protection only
to speech of employees as "citizens on matters of public con-
cern." 0
5
The first 10 6 and third 10 7 inquiries in the three-pronged inquiry
are questions of law for courts, not jurors, to decide. The second
inquiry is what the Fourth Circuit refers to as the "classic motiva-
tional question [which] is one of fact"'08 for the jury or trier-of-fact
to determine. 10 9 The ultimate question as to whether employee
speech is protected is, however, a question of law for the courts: 110
"the extent of protection afforded by the first amendment to ex-
pression is ultimately a question of law for the courts, but ... the
jury's function is to find the underlying facts to which the legal
standard is ultimately applied.""' As part of the Pickering calcu-
104. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
105. Accord Pickering and its progeny.
106. See Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998); Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48
F.3d 879 (5th Cir. 1995); Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 1993); Stever v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. 625, 943 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1991); Wulf v. Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989);
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986), affd in part and remanded in
part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
107. See Acevedo-Diaz, 1 F.3d 62; Wulf, 883 F.2d 842; Daniels, 801 F.2d 687; Jett, 798
F.2d 748; Brown v. Dep't of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., 735 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
108. Daniels, 801 F.2d at 689 (citing Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287).
109. See Brady, 145 F.3d 691; Acevedo-Diaz, 1 F.3d 62; Wulf, 883 F.2d 842; Hall v. Ford,
856 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Jett, 798 F.2d 748.
110. While this aptly captures the general view of the circuit courts of appeals, the
Fourth Circuit has since disavowed the position it held in Kim v. Coppin State College, 662
F.2d 1055, 1062 (4th Cir. 1981), instead choosing to hold that "the entire Pickering balanc-
ing process is an inquiry of law for the court ... the advisory jury had no role to play."
Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 23 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, for the Fourth Circuit, while
the second inquiry is still a question of fact, the first and third inquiries are completely
questions of law. Therefore, judges, not jurors, weigh the operational efficiency Pickering
calculus factors of disruption of operations, disharmony among coworkers, or breach of a
confidential working relationship, and the underlying facts applicable to these factors. See
J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1985),
for an extensive discussion of the role of juries in First Amendment cases.
111. Kim, 662 F.2d at 1062; Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th
Cir. 1989); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1984); McGee v. S. Pemiscot Sch. Dist.
R-V, 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983).
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lus factors, the circuit courts of appeals also consider the time,
place, and manner of the speech.
112
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals considers the
following as part of the Pickering calculus factors:
[t]he sensitivity and confidential nature of the employee's po-
sition and the government's consequently legitimate need for
secrecy; the nature of the subject on which the employee
speaks out; the truth or falsity of the employee's statement;
any interference with the performance of his job resulting
from the speech; the context of the speech and accompanying
conduct; [and] its anticipated effect on agency morale and
upon working relationships with immediate superiors. 113
Of the above factors, the following are additional District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals factors not articulated by other
circuits as part of the Pickering calculus factors: (i) the govern-
ment's legitimate need for secrecy; (ii) the nature of the subject on
which the employee speaks out; (iii) the context of the conduct ac-
companying the speech; and (iv) the anticipated effect on agency
morale.
In applying the Pickering balancing test, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals makes "an individualized and search-
ing review of the factors asserted by the employer to justify the
discharge."' 14 According to the court, "the Pickering cause of ac-
tion has four elements." 1 5 First, the public employee has to show
that his or her speech was on a matter of public concern: "fi]f the
speech is not of public concern ... it is unnecessary ... to scruti-
nize the reasons for [the] discharge . . . at least absent the most
unusual circumstances";1 6 "[b]ut neither does a topic otherwise of
public concern lose its importance merely because it arises in an
employee dispute." 1 7 If the employee meets step number one, the
second step is the court's application of the Pickering balancing
test, weighing the interest of the employee, as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public interest against the interest of the
State, as an employer, in its operational efficiency. 118 At the third
112. See, e.g., Belyeu v. Coosa County Bd. of Educ., 998 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1993); Bow-
man, 723 F.2d 640; Lewis, 805 F.2d at 314; Ferrara, 81 F.2d at 1513.
113. Hanson v. Hoffman, 628 F.2d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
114. Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
115. See Hall, 856 F.2d at 258.
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 260.
118. Id. at 258.
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step, the employee must prove that his or her speech was a sub-
stantial or motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory act of the
employer. In the fourth step, the employer is afforded the oppor-
tunity to establish the "same decision anyway" defense. 119
Like the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals added a new dimension to the Pickering
calculus factors, noting that
[i]n undertaking this [Pickering] balancing procedure, both
the character and effect of the public employee's speech are
relevant considerations. Thus an employer has a greater in-
terest in curtailing erroneous statements than correct ones,
and still a greater interest in curtailing deliberate falsehoods.
The government also has a more legitimate concern for speech
which actually impairs its functions than for that which does
not. Correspondingly, an employee's interest in making pub-
lic statements is heightened according to their veracity and
innocuity. 120
The First Circuit considers the veracity of the content of the em-
ployee's speech as one of the Pickering calculus factors.
According to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, there are "three
elements a public employee must show to prevail on a First
Amendment claim against his or her employer."'121 First, the court
must determine if the employee's speech involves a matter of pub-
lic concern. "If it does not, then its First Amendment value is low,
and a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the wisdom of internal decisions arising therefrom."'122 Also, the
First Circuit has held that "[w]here a public employee speaks out
on a topic which is clearly a legitimate matter of inherent concern
to the electorate, the court may eschew further inquiry into the
employee's motives as revealed by the 'form and context' of the
expression."'123 If the court finds that the employee's speech in-
volved a matter of public concern, the next step is the application
of the Pickering balancing test.124 At the third step, the employee
must establish causation: that his or her protected speech was a
119. Id.
120. Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 839 (1st Cir. 1985).
121. Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 453 (1st Cir. 2003); O'Connor v. Steeves, 994
F.2d 905, 912 (1st Cir. 1993).
122. Fabiano, 352 F.3d at 453 (citations omitted).
123. O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 913-14.
124. Fabiano, 352 F.3d at 455.
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substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory act of
the employer. 125 Though not articulated as a distinct step, the
employer then has the opportunity to establish the "same decision
anyway" defense. 126
While not unique to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, other
circuit courts have not clearly articulated, as has the Second Cir-
cuit, that a whistleblowing employee "may not base her claim of
retaliation upon complained-of-acts that predated her speaking
out."1
27
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' approach to determining if
a public employee prevails in a First Amendment claim of retalia-
tion can be summarized succinctly. The employee must show:
[i] [that] the speech at issue was protected, [ii] that he suf-
fered an adverse employment action, and [iii] that there was a
causal connection between the protected speech and the ad-
verse employment action. In particular, the causal connection
must be sufficient to warrant the inference that the protected
speech was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. 12
8
The determination of whether speech is protected is pursuant to
the Connick "matter of public concern" test. 129 However, "the fact
that an employee's speech touches on matters of public concern
will not render that speech protected where the employee's motive
for the speech is private and personal."'130 Additionally, the court
has held that
[v]irtually every citizen has a personal interest in matters of
public concern; after all, each citizen is a member of the public
and is, in some way, impacted by the resolution of societal
problems. The determinative question is whether that inter-
est arises from the speaker's status as a public citizen or from
the speaker's status as a public employee.131
According to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, employee tes-
timony before an official government fact-finding or adjudicatory
125. Id. at 457.
126. O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 913.
127. Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325 (2d Cir. 1996).
128. Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
129. Blum, 18 F.3d at 1010.




body is inherently a matter of public concern, regardless of its con-
tent. 132 For example, an employee's voluntary testimony at a bail
hearing is inherently a matter of public concern. 133 In addition, a
"public employee's appearance as a witness, even in the absence of
actual testimony, is 'speech' under Pickering"'34 as "the context of
a courtroom appearance raises speech to a level of public con-
cern"' 135 which could effectively confer First Amendment protection
to speech that is otherwise unprotected. 136 However, even then,
the Pickering balancing test needs to be applied to such speech. 
37
The employee's testimony does not have to be pursuant to a sub-
poena; voluntary testimonies are also inherently matters of public
concern. 1
38
With respect to the content, form, and context elements of the
Connick test, the Third Circuit's position is that
[t]he content of the speech may help to characterize it as re-
lating to a matter of social or political concern of the commu-
nity if, for example, the speaker seeks to "bring to light actual
or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust" on the part
of government officials. The form and context of the speech
may help to characterize it as relating to a matter of social or
political concern to the community if, for example, the forum
where the speech activity takes place is not confined merely to
the public office where the speaker is employed. 1
39
Unlike the Fourth Circuit Court, which has held that content is
more important than form and context in the Connick test, 140 the
Third Circuit holds that content, form, and context all play impor-
tant roles in the test. 141
The Third Circuit uses the three-step inquiry mentioned ear-
lier. 142 As part of the Pickering calculus factors, the Third Circuit
considers the extent to which the employee used the speech to re-
solve what is essentially a private grievance of the employee, as
132. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996).
133. Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882 (3d Cir. 1997).
134. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291.
135. Green, 105 F.3d at 887.
136. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291 n.4.
137. Id. at 1291.
138. Green, 81 F.3d at 887.
139. Holder, 987 F.2d at 195.
140. Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1988).
141. Holder, 987 F.2d at 195; Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291.
142. See Holder, 987 F.2d at 195.
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well as the extent to which the employee threatens the authority
of the employer. 1
43
In making the inquiry as to whether employee speech is about a
matter of public concern pursuant to Connick, the Fourth Circuit
looks at the content, form, and context of the speech.144 The criti-
cal inquiry in this determination as to whether the speech deals
with a matter of public concern, according to the Fourth Circuit, is
"whether the public or the community is likely to be truly con-
cerned with or interested in the particular expression, or whether
it is more properly viewed as essentially a private matter between
employer and employee." 145 As part of context under the Connick
test, nonexclusive and non-dispositive indicia considered by the
Fourth Circuit Court include whether the speech was at a public
meeting. 146
Piver is one of a limited number of cases in the circuit courts of
appeals where "form" (an element of the Connick test) has truly
been applied, as opposed to just summarily mentioned (or not
mentioned) as applicable, which is the tradition in the cases.
147
Any of the cases cited in this article from the circuit courts would
adequately illustrate their tendency to summarily find "form" in
existence without actually providing real substance as to how this
conclusion came about in the application process.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished between its findings about
context, form, and content in Jurgensen v. Fairfax County148 and
Piver. In Jurgensen, a police officer was demoted for clandestinely
releasing an internal audit report about working conditions to a
newspaper reporter.149 In Piver, a high school teacher was termi-
nated for speaking out in support of his principal getting ten-
ure. 150 The court noted that the content of speech in Jurgensen
was working conditions at the department, while in Piver the con-
tent of the speech was focused on the adequacy of the principal's
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Piver v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987).
145. Piver, 835 F.2d at 1079-80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 777.
147. See, e.g., Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D.
Ala. 2005), affd, 186 F. App'x 885 (11th Cir. 2006); Love-Lane, 355 F.3d 767; Sharp v.
Lindsey, 285 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2002), cases where "form," an element of the Connick test,
was merely summarily mentioned (or not even mentioned) in application of the Connick
test.
148. 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984).
149. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871.
150. Piver, 835 F.2d 1076.
Winter 2008
Duquesne Law Review
performance. 151 The court distinguished the "form" of speech in
both cases as follows:
The form of the speech in Jurgensen involved the handing
over of a report ... to a journalist at a private dinner meeting.
The forms of Piver's speech included an oral presentation of
his own thoughts at a public school board meeting, the guid-
ing of class discussion and participation in his social studies
class, and private conversations with the chairman of the
school board and with other teachers. 1
5 2
With respect to the context, the court stated:
The context of the speech in Jurgensen included a departmen-
tal regulation forbidding the release of information by em-
ployees ... without specific prior authorization. The context
of Piver's speech was fundamentally different. The speech
took place primarily in a public meeting called for the purpose
of discussing Jourdan's [the principal's] tenure. The speech
delivered information uniquely available to Piver; as a
teacher under Jourdan, Piver had important insights into
Jourdan's performance on the job. The speech was directed to
a small community in which the speaker and the subjects
were personally known by almost everyone. 153
In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit held that the speech was not a
matter of public concern, 154 whereas in Piver it held that the
speech was a matter of public concern. 1
55
The Fourth Circuit points out a crucial problem with application
of the Connick test: "Connick [makes] it plain that the 'public con-
cern' or 'community interest' inquiry is better designed-and more
concerned-to identify a narrow spectrum of employee speech that
is not entitled even to qualified protection than it is to set outer
limits on all that is." 156 Taking into account this challenge in ap-
plying the Connick test, the Fourth Circuit held:
The principle that emerges [in application of the Connick test]
is that all public employee speech that by content is within
151. Id. at 1080.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888.
155. Piver, 835 F.2d at 1080.
156. Id. at 1079 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the general protection of the first amendment is entitled to at
least qualified protection against public employer chilling ac-
tion except that which, realistically viewed, is of purely per-
sonal concern to the employee-most typically, a private per-
sonnel grievance. 1
57
Cases where the employee speaks out about his or her own em-
ployment situation are likely to be rejected as personal grievances
when "that employment situation holds little or no interest for the
public at large." 1
58
The Fourth Circuit has found that "disharmony is not a per se
defense to dismissal."'159 Moreover, the court has held that the
content portion of the Connick test is the most important of "con-
tent, form, and context."'160 The court has also affirmed that the
negative definition of "matter of public concern" is not consequen-
tial to the determination of what constitutes matter of public con-
cern: "[i]n deciding that a statement falls within the realm of pub-
lic concern, it is not sufficient to determine that it does not fall on
the 'private grievance' end of the spectrum." 161
The Fifth Circuit Court's framework for determining whether
an employee's speech constitutes protected speech under the First
Amendment is as follows:
First, the speech must have involved a matter of public con-
cern .... Second, the public employee's interest in comment-
ing on matters of public concern must outweigh the public
employer's interest in promoting efficiency. . . . The third
prong of the test is based on causation; the employee's speech
must have motivated the decision to discharge the em-
ployee. 162
According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Pickering
calculus includes:
(1) the degree to which the employee's activity involved a
matter of public concern; (2) the time, place, and manner of
the employee's activity; (3) whether close working relation-
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 1080; see Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
159. See Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1982).
160. Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1988).
161. Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988).
162. Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Thompson v. Starkville,
901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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ships are essential to fulfilling the employee's public respon-
sibilities and the potential effect of the employee's activity on
those relationships; (4) whether the employee's activity may
be characterized as hostile, abusive, or insubordinate; [and]
(5) whether the activity impairs discipline by superiors or har-
mony among coworkers.1
63
The inclusion of factors number one and four as part of the
Pickering calculus factors is unique to the Fifth Circuit. 164 Also
considered is whether the speech is "likely to generate contro-
versy." 
1 65
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has held that in the
Pickering balancing test, disharmony (one of the factors from the
Pickering calculus) is not a per se defense to termination of whis-
tleblowing employees. 166 Moreover, an employee's speech may
contain both private concerns and public concerns and still consti-
tute speech on a matter of public concern.1
67
With respect to the employee's burden of proof in a First
Amendment whistleblowing case, the Fifth Circuit requires a fac-
163. Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 707 (5th Cir. 1998); Click v. Copeland,
970 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760 (5th Cir. 1988).
164. Although there is a reference to the matter of public concern in one of the Pickering
calculus factors as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering, that factor
deals with the employee's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern. There-
fore, before the Pickering calculus factors are applied, the employee's speech must already
be determined to be a matter of public concern. Viewed one way, what the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in essence has done by including this factor ("the degree to which the
employee's activity involved a matter of public concern," Brady, 145 F.3d at 707) as one of
the Pickering calculus factors is include the threshold determination in the calculus-a
redundant inclusion, since the United States Supreme Court held in Connick that the de-
termination of whether speech touches on a matter of public concern is a threshold re-
quirement for cases in the public employment-free speech jurisprudence under the First
Amendment.
Viewed another way, the Fifth Circuit Court's inclusion of this factor as part of the
Pickering calculus might only be a way for the court to look at the degree to which the em-
ployee's speech-already determined to touch on a matter of public concern-involves a
matter of public concern. If so, this might be a Pickering calculus factor that helps deter-
mine the degree to which speech that is a matter of public concern involves (i) matters of
public concern; (ii) substantial matters of public concern; or (iii) inherent matters of public
concern. Often, however, as part of the threshold requirement, courts have already deter-
mined what degree of public concern the speech involves as part of the process inherent in
proving that the speech constitutes a matter of public concern in the first place. So this
factor in the Pickering calculus as set forth by the Fifth Circuit could actually be the step
for applying the determination, made earlier in a case by a court, of the degree to which the
speech involves matter of public concern.
165. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1999).
166. Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 629 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 926 (1981).
167. Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1998); Thompson, 901
F.2d at 463-65.
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tor assumed but not explicitly stated as a requirement in the
framework used by most of the other courts of appeals: proof that
the employee suffered adverse action. 168 In addition, the Fifth
Circuit requires proof from the employee that his or her interest in
commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the em-
ployer's interest in operational efficiency. 169
The Fifth Circuit has held that employee testimony before an of-
ficial government fact-finding or adjudicatory body is inherently a
matter of public concern, regardless of its content. 170 This in-
cludes testimony before a grand jury, as well as testimony in a
civil or criminal proceeding. 171 The reasoning is thus: "[t]he goal
of grand jury proceedings, of criminal trials, and of civil trials is to
resolve a dispute by gathering the facts and arriving at the truth,
a goal sufficiently important to render testimony given in these
contexts speech of public concern."' 172 With respect to "citizen"
status versus "employee" status, the court has held that "public
employees are entitled to the same measure of constitutional pro-
tection as enjoyed by their civilian counterparts when speaking as
citizens and not as employees."'
173
In determining what constitutes a matter of public concern, the
Fifth Circuit has stated that "[a]nother factor considered in de-
termining whether speech is on a matter of public concern is
whether the comments were made against a backdrop of wide-
spread debate in the community."'
174
[I]ssues do not rise to a level of public concern by virtue of the
speaker's interest in the subject matter; rather, they achieve
that protected status if the words or conduct are conveyed by
168. See Harris, 168 F.3d at 220; see also Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th
Cir. 2000); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1994).
169. Harris, 168 F.3d at 220.
170. Id. at 222; Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th
Cir. 1989); see also Pro, 81 F.3d 1283.
171. See Reeves v. Clairborne County Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to adopt the position taken by the Third
and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals, Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 40
F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); so has the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that
adoption of such a position would be elevating context over content, since a court appear-
ance or other appearance before a fact-finding or adjudicatory body deals with context;
according to the Fourth Circuit, content is more important than context and form in the
Connick test, Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1988); see generally Arvinger, 862 F.2d
at 79.
172. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1565 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
174. Harris, 168 F.3d at 223.
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the teacher in his role as a citizen and not in his role as an
employee of the school district. 175
Accordingly, for the Fifth Circuit, a determination of whether the
employee spoke as a citizen versus as an employee is dispositive of
whether speech is about a matter of public concern. 1
76
The framework used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
analyzing cases of First Amendment retaliation claims by public
employees is as follows-the employee must show that: (i) his or
her speech is constitutionally protected speech under the First
Amendment; (ii) the employer's adverse action caused the em-
ployee to suffer injury that is likely to chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in the protected speech;177 and
(iii) the adverse action was motivated at least in part as a re-
sponse to the employee's exercise of his or her right to free
speech.178 If the employee meets each of these three steps of his or
her burden, only then does the burden of persuasion shift to the
employer to establish the "same decision anyway" defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.179
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals uses a two-part test to de-
termine if speech is constitutionally protected under the first
prong of the plaintiffs burden of proof under the Mount Healthy
"balance of burdens."'80  The first step is a determination of
whether the speech is about a matter of public concern; if so, the
employee must show in the second step that the employee's inter-
est, as a citizen, in commenting upon a matter of public concern
outweighs the State's interest, as an employer, in the efficiency of
the services it performs.' 8 ' Thus, it is in this second step of the
175. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 798-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. See, e.g., Dodds v. Childers, 933 F.2d 271, 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1991); Dorsett v. Bd. of
Trs. for State Coils. & Univs., 940 F.2d 121, 129 (5th Cir. 1991); see generally Kirkland, 890
F.2d 794.
177. Retaliatory acts could be the basis for an employee to establish adverse action that
caused the employee injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in the speech--e.g., termination, Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d
1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001); involuntary transfer, Leary, 228 F.3d at 738.
178. Leary, 228 F.3d at 737; see Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1048.
179. Id. This is the very same framework the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals uses. See,
e.g., Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1995).
180. Recall, the entire Mount Healthy "mixed motives" framework is sometimes referred
to as the "balance of burdens." See supra note 41. Also, recall that the first prong of the
plaintiffs burden of proof under the Mount Healthy "balance of burdens" is a determination
of whether the employee's speech is protected under the First Amendment.
181. Vanessa A. Wernicke, Teachers' Speech Rights in the Classroom: An Analysis of
Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1482 (2003); Bailey v. Floyd
County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1997).
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determination of whether employee speech is constitutionally pro-
tected that the Sixth Circuit applies the Pickering balancing test.
The Sixth Circuit has rejected the approach of the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits which holds that, in the analysis of whether speech
touches on a matter of public concern, the role of the employee as
citizen or employee in speaking is determinative. 182 Instead, the
Sixth Circuit gives the greatest relative determinative importance
to the content of the speech. 183
In addition, it is the position of the Sixth Circuit that
even if a public employee were acting out of a private motive
with no intent to air her speech publicly . . . so long as the
speech relates to matters of political, social, or other concern
to the community, as opposed to matters only of personal in-
terest, it shall be considered as touching upon matters of pub-
lic concern. '
8 4
Likewise, in applying the Pickering calculus factors, the court
"give[s] substantial weight to the government employer's concerns
of workplace efficiency, harmony, and discipline." 18 5 An exception
is "when the disruptive employee speech can be traced back to
when the government's express decision permitted the employee
to engage in that speech."'1 6 Moreover, an employee's
decision to speak cannot immunize her from an adverse em-
ployment decision arising out of inappropriate workplace be-
havior unrelated to her protected speech. Similarly, an em-
ployer is not immunized from its decision to terminate an em-
ployee based on her speech simply because that employee has
engaged in other conduct that could have constituted legiti-
mate grounds for discharge. 1
87
The Seventh Circuit looks at the three-pronged inquiry as a
two-step process. The first step is a determination of whether the
speech involves a matter of public concern pursuant to the Con-
nick test; if so, the next step is the application of the Pickering
182. See Wernicke, supra note 181. See generally Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1055; Boring v.
Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366-67 (4th Cir. 1998); Kirkland, 890 F.2d
794.
183. See Wernicke, supra note 181; Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052.
184. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 1054.
186. Id. at 1054-55.
187. Id. at 1059.
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balancing test, a part of which is the application of the Pickering
calculus factors including context, time, place, and manner; the
employee's motives in voicing the concerns; and the gravity of the
matter of public concern expressed.188 The employer "does not
have to prove a legitimate reason for taking adverse action against
the plaintiff until the plaintiff has come forth with sufficient evi-
dence to support a prima facie case of substantial motivation."'
18 9
In the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, public employee speech
is protected by the First Amendment if: (i) it will be protected if
uttered by a private citizen; (ii) it involves more than a personal
employee grievance; and (iii) the employer does not show a con-
vincing reason to prohibit the speech.190 Once the employee estab-
lishes that the speech is on a matter of public concern, he "place[s]
his speech, prima facie, within the protection of the First Amend-
ment."'191 The Seventh Circuit uses the term "prima facie" protec-
tion to distinguish the fact that when a public employee-as op-
posed to a nonpublic employee citizen-speaks and proves that the
speech was protected by the First Amendment, that is not the end
of the case, as the employer has the benefit of the Mount Healthy
defense to avoid liability. In other words, the employee who meets
his or her burden of proof pursuant to Mount Healthy only has
"prima facie" First Amendment protection. 192
In enunciating the "matter of public concern," the Seventh Cir-
cuit has stated that
when the Supreme Court in its cases establishing and bound-
ing the rights of public employees to exercise free speech lim-
ited those rights to speech on matters of public concern, they
did not mean matters of transcendent importance, such as the
origins of the universe or the merits of constitutional monar-
chy. 193
Building on this, the court has held that the mere fact that "the
public was not large, the issues were not of global significance,
188. Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985); Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293,
295 (7th Cir. 1984); Zook v. Brown, 748 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1984).
189. Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 17 F.3d 1059, 1068
(7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
190. Hulbert v. Wilhelm, 120 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of
Edgerton, 97 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1996); Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194,
197 (7th Cir. 1996).
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and... [the employee's] participation was not (we mean no disre-
spect) vital to the survival of Western civilization" 194 was not
enough to place the speech "outside the orbit of protection." 195
With respect to private communication to superiors, the Sev-
enth Circuit has held that
[a]lthough the [F]irst [A]mendment is not limited to speech
that is broadcast to the world ... an employee's decision to de-
liver the message in private supports an inference that the
real concern is the employment relation-and a school district
as employer may react to speech about the workplace in ways
a government as regulator may not. 1
96
However, the court recognizes that "[F]irst [A]mendment protec-
tion extends to public employees who express their opinions dur-
ing working hours as well as those who engage in speech while off-
duty."19
7
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has held that em-
ployee speech will constitute protected speech if two requirements
are met:
[T]o be protected by the First Amendment, (1) the speech by a
government employee must be on a matter of public concern,
and (2) the employee's interest in expressing herself on the
matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could
cause to the interest of the state, as employer, in promoting
efficient and effective public service. 
198
In this circuit, these two elements are essential to satisfying the
first part of the burden of the employee under Mount Healthy: that
the employee's speech is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In essence, what the Seventh Circuit does in real terms, like the
Sixth Circuit, is collapse the balancing aspect of Pickering into the
employee's portion of the burden-of-proof allocation set forth in
Mount Healthy, so that the employee is required to show that the
employee's interest in speaking is not outweighed by the interests
of the state, as employer, in promoting effective and efficient ser-
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Wales v. Bd. of Educ. of Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. 300, 120 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
197. Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1988).
198. Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
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vice.199 Unclear and unarticulated is why the court takes this ap-
proach, since in the very same case it stated: "even termination
because of protected speech may be justified when legitimate coun-
tervailing government interests are sufficiently strong."200  In
other words, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes (i) protected speech
on the one hand, and (ii) countervailing government interests on
the other hand-a distinction more in line with the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in Pickering and its progeny than the
approach the Seventh Circuit Court takes.
Making this distinction clearly contradicts the Seventh Circuit's
own approach of collapsing into the "protected speech" determina-
tion a burden on the employee to show that the speech was not
outweighed by the countervailing interests of the employer.
201 It
is also inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's statement that
"[w]hen an employee speaks out about actual wrongdoing or
breach of public trust ... the government must make a more sub-
stantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disrup-
tive."20 2 If the government is to bear the burden of proving that
speech is disruptive-a Pickering calculus factor and, conse-
quently, an integral part of the Pickering test-does the speech
not have to first be shown to constitute protected speech under the
First Amendment?
For if the speech is not yet determined to be protected speech,
why would a court go through the entire process of applying the
Pickering balancing test and require the government to bear the
burden of proof with respect to some of the Pickering calculus fac-
tors, without yet moving beyond the employee's part of the burden
of proof enunciated in Mount Healthy? Proceeding in such a man-
ner would be in contravention of Mount Healthy's burden-of-proof
framework, the very notion of judicial economy, and the principle
of fairness to the parties. It is unfair to the parties to go through
the entire balancing test before the employee has met the first
part of the Mount Healthy balance of burdens-that the employee
prove that the speech is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
199. Keep in mind, however, that while taking this approach, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in the very same case acknowledged the muffled nature of the Pickering balanc-
ing test. See Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1014.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. This very same inconsistency is evident in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' ap-
proach.
202. Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1018 (emphasis added).
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With respect to the Connick test for a matter of public concern,
the Seventh Circuit has held that content is more important than
form and context. 20 3 In this circuit, indicia of a matter of public
concern under the Connick test include whether the employee "is-
sue[d] a public call to change." 20 4 The Seventh Circuit adds the
following to the Pickering calculus factors: (i) the context in which
the underlying dispute began;20 5 (ii) whether the subject matter of
the speech was one on which debate was crucial to informed deci-
sion-making; 20 6 (iii) "whether the speaker should be regarded as a
member of the general public";20 7 and (iv) "the point of the speech
in question: was it the employee's point to bring wrongdoing to
light? Or to raise other issues of public concern, because they are
of public concern? Or was the point to further some purely private
interest?"2
08
The third factor above seems very similar to the "citizen" versus
"employee" status determination, which is vital to the determina-
tion of whether the employee's speech is protected speech under
the First Amendment pursuant to Pickering, a factor not recog-
nized by the Seventh Circuit. While inclusion of this factor as part
of the Pickering calculus factors is consistent with the Seventh
Circuit's approach-that to be protected speech under the First
Amendment a determination that the employee's interest in
speaking is not outweighed by the countervailing interests of the
public employer must be made209-it is inconsistent with the very
language of Pickering and its progeny. This approach subsumes
the Pickering calculus factors within the employee's Mount
Healthy burden of proof.2
10
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adds the following factors
to the Pickering calculus factors: (i) the context in which the dis-
pute arose; 211 and (ii) the degree of public interest in the speech. 212
203. Id. at 1014.
204. Id. at 1016.
205. Id. at 1015.
206. Id.
207. Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1015.
208. Id. (quoting Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1994); Linhart v. Glatfelter,
771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)).
209. See generally Khuans, 123 F.3d 1010.
210. The Mount Healthy burden of proof is discussed supra pp. 137-38.
211. See Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1986); Bowman
v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1983).
212. While the "degree of public interest in speech" is considered by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals as one of the Pickering calculus factors, in determining whether the
speech involves a "matter of public concern" pursuant to the Connick test, the Eighth Cir-
cuit does not consider the degree of public interest in speech. Instead, as the Eighth Circuit
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Thus, context is not merely considered when applying the Connick
test; it is also considered as part of the Pickering balancing test.
The Eighth Circuit holds that "courts must also accord to the
government the wide degree of discretion necessary for the proper
management of internal affairs and personnel decisions. The de-
gree of discretion allowed varies with the nature of the employee's
duties and the legitimate needs of the government. ' 213 With re-
spect to the "degree of public interest in speech," indicia used by
the Eighth Circuit include media attention and parent involve-
ment.214 In addition, with respect to public school employees, the
court gives weight to the fact that "[t]he question of what consti-
tutes the proper care and education of children is one of the most
frequently debated issues in the public forum." 215
As pointed out earlier, the Eighth Circuit approaches the three-
pronged inquiry differently from the other courts of appeals. This
approach is summarized thus:
First Amendment decisions in the public-employee-firing con-
text require application of a three-step process .... The first
step is to determine whether the speech was "protected" un-
der the Constitution. Under Connick, only speech addressing
a "matter of public concern" is protected. . . . Even then,
Pickering instructs the court to balance the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.... To be protected, speech must pass
both the Connick and Pickering tests. The second and third
steps involve causation. The employee must show that the
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision. . . .Finally, the defendant may show
that the employment action would have been taken even in
the absence of the protected conduct. 216
With respect to private communication to supervisors, the ap-
proach of the Eighth Circuit is that "[a] teacher has a constitu-
has noted, the "focus [is] on the employee's role in conveying the speech rather than the
public's interest in the speech's topic." Bausworth v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 986 F.2d 1197,
1198 (8th Cir. 1993).
213. Bowman, 723 F.2d at 644.
214. Id.; see also Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. Schs., 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
215. Bowman, 723 F.2d at 644.
216. Lewis, 805 F.2d at 313 (citing Roberts, 773 F.2d at 953-54 ) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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tional right ... to privately express to his superiors, in a reason-
able manner, his criticism of ... educational or disciplinary poli-
cies." 217 The first inquiry is to determine if a matter of public con-
cern is involved. 218 If so, pursuant to Givhan, the time, place, and
manner of the speech, as well as its content, must then be exam-
ined in order to determine if operational efficiency is threat-
ened.2
19
The Eighth Circuit defines the focus of whether speech is a mat-
ter of public concern as
the role that the employee has assumed in advancing the par-
ticular expressions: that of a concerned public citizen, inform-
ing the public that the state institution is not properly dis-
charging its duties, or engaged in some way in misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance; or merely as an employee, con-
cerned only with the internal policies or practices which are of
relevance only to the employees of that institution.
220
"When focusing on the employee's role, we consider whether the
employee attempted to communicate the speech to the public at
large and the employee's motivation in speaking";221 as part of this
examination of the employee's role, the Eighth Circuit looks at
whether, when speaking, the employee was in the role of a citi-
zen. 22
2
The Ninth Circuit uses the same three-pronged inquiry as gen-
erally used by the other courts of appeals. 223 Due to the inherent
challenges in figuring out what constitutes a "matter of public con-
cern," the Ninth Circuit Court has defined the concept in the
negative: "[s]peech by public employees may be characterized as
not of public concern when it is clear that such speech deals with
individual personnel disputes and grievances and that the infor-
mation would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the
performance of the governmental agencies.
' 224
217. Roberts, 773 F.2d at 956 (citing Derrickson v. Bd. of Educ., 703 F.2d 309, 316 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
218. Id. at 954.
219. Id. at 956.
220. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
221. Bausworth v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 986 F.2d 1197, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993).
222. Bausworth, 986 F.2d at 1198.
223. Lewis, 805 F.2d at 313 (citing Roberts, 773 F.2d at 953-54) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
224. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
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The Tenth Circuit has added the truth or falsity of speech to the
Pickering calculus factors and assigned non-specific weights to
this factor 225 and to the value of the employee's speech to the pub-
lic. 226 According to the Tenth Circuit,
the issue of the truth or falsity of the statements at issue is
relevant to both the threshold public concern analysis and the
balancing required under Pickering. It is difficult to see how
a maliciously or recklessly false statement could be viewed as
addressing a matter of public concern. Nonetheless, a merely
erroneous statement may be of public concern. 227
Like the other courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit looks to con-
tent, form, and context in determining what constitutes a matter
of public concern. In examining content, the court will examine
"the extent to which the content of the employee speech was calcu-
lated to disclose wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance
on the part of governmental officials in the conduct of their official
duties."228 In Wulf, the court held that an employee who wrote to
the Attorney General asking for an investigation into the practices
of the department spoke on a matter of public concern. 229 The
court noted that the "form" of speech in that case was the letter to
the Attorney General. 2
30
The following four-step process represents the Tenth Circuit
Court's framework for reviewing public employees' First Amend-
ment retaliation claims:
First, the court must determine whether the employee's
speech can be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern .... If so, the court must then pro-
ceed to the second step and balance the employee's interest,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public service it performs through its em-
225. See Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 918 F. Supp. 1475, 1483 (D. Wyo.
1996); see also Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492, 881 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1989).
226. Wulfv. Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 858 (10th Cir. 1989).
227. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 858 n.24. Despite assertions that various statements in the case
were false and trivial, the court found those statements in Wulf to be matters of public
concern, noting that only knowingly or recklessly false statements may not be matters of
public concern. Id. at 857.
228. Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445-46 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988) (citations omitted).
229. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 857.
230. Id. at 860 n.26.
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ployees .... Assuming that the Pickering balancing test tips
in favor of the employee, the employee, under the third step,
must prove that the protected speech was a substantial factor
or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment deci-
sion. . . . Finally, if the employee makes this showing, the
burden then shifts to the employer to show by a preponder-
ance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision
* . . even in the absence of the protected conduct. Steps one
and two concern whether the expression at issue is subject to
the protection of the First Amendment. Thus, they present
legal questions to be resolved by the court. In contrast, the
third and fourth steps concern causation and involve ques-
tions of fact to be resolved by the jury. 231
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit considers the motive of the speaker,
particularly whether the employee "spoke out based on the same
motivation that would move the public to speak out"232 as an in-
dicium of whether speech constitutes a matter of public concern.
According to the court, "the controversial character of a statement
is irrelevant to the question [of] whether it deals with a matter of
public concern . . . because the focus is on the motive of the
speaker."
233
The Eleventh Circuit's approach to public employment-free
speech cases can be gleaned from the following:
[T]he fact that an employee is retaliated against for exercising
constitutionally protected speech does not automatically ren-
der the disciplinary action unconstitutional. A public em-
ployee's free speech rights are not absolute. The employee's
interest must be weighed against that of the state to deter-
mine which is more compelling in a given situation.
234
Moreover, in the Eleventh Circuit, "[t]he Pickering balance is
not triggered unless it is first determined that the employee's
speech is constitutionally protected." 235
Like the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has
added the degree of public interest in the employee's speech to the
231. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
232. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 812; see also Michael T. Jilka, Free Speech Rights of Public
Employees, 71-JAN J. KAN. B. ASS'N 30 (2002).
233. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986).
235. Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1513-14.
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Pickering calculus factors. 236 However, it has also held that the
degree of public interest in the subject of speech must not be
equated with whether the speech is a matter of public concern:
"[t]he First Amendment affords special protection to speech that
may inform public debate about how our society is to be gov-
erned-regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a
public controversy."
237
The Eleventh Circuit has a different order to the three-pronged
inquiry:
First, the court must determine whether the expression ad-
dressed a matter of public concern .... Second, the court must
consider whether the employee's first amendment interest
outweighs the interests of the government, as an employer, in
the efficiency of public services. . . . If the public employee
prevails on the balancing test, the district court must deter-
mine whether the employee's speech played a substantial part
in the government's decision to demote or discharge her .... If
the public employee prevails on these issues, the government
has the opportunity to show . . . that it would have reached
the same employment decision in the absence of the protected
conduct.238
The Eleventh Circuit considers whether the employee spoke in
the role of a citizen or primarily as an employee, in analyzing the
context portion of the Connick test. 239 In addition, this circuit re-
cently held that "[w]hile speech already determined to discuss a
matter of public concern does not lose its public character solely
because it is privately expressed, a failure to make the public
aware of a grievance can undermine its public nature. ' 240
A theme evident in the discussions supra of the various circuit
courts of appeals approaches to Pickering and its progeny is that,
just like with the United States Supreme Court's development of
the public employment-free speech jurisprudence, the circuit
courts' jurisprudence has been hazy, at variance intra- as well as
inter-circuit, and often indeterminate.
236. Id. at 1514.
237. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
238. Belyeu v. Coosa County Bd. of Educ., 998 F.2d 925, 928 (11th Cir. 1993).
239. Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271 (M.D. Ala.
2005), affd, 186 F. App'x 885 (11th Cir. 2006).
240. Gilder-Lucas, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8).
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III. MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
In Connick, the Supreme Court revealed the test for determin-
ing whether public employee speech constitutes speech on a mat-
ter of public concern: "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form,
and context of a given statement. ' 241 The content, form, and con-
text of the statement must be examined to determine whether
employee speech "relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community."
242
There are three levels of matter of public concern: (i) matter of
public concern; 243 (ii) substantial matter of public concern; 244 and
(iii) inherent matter of public concern. 245 The difference between
speech about a matter of public concern and that which is about a
substantial matter of public concern is thus: "a stronger showing
may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially in-
volved matters of public concern." 246  The Supreme Court has
never articulated a test for determining what constitutes an "in-
herent matter of public concern."
With respect to inherent matters of public concern, the Fifth
Circuit, for example, has held that employee testimony before an
official government fact-finding or adjudicatory body is inherently
a matter of public concern. 24 7 In Givhan, the United States Su-
preme Court held that an employee's speech about the racially
discriminatory nature of her employer's policies in purpose and
effect was inherently a matter of public concern. "[C]ourts have
had some difficulty deciding when speech deals with an issue of
public concern"248 because "[tihe definition of matters of public
concern is imprecise"; 249 in fact, the "matter of public concern" has
241. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
242. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
243. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
244. See, e.g., McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
245. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410; accord Connick, 461
U.S. at 148 n.8.
246. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
247. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th
Cir. 1989); see also Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1999).
248. See McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1113 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle
to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teach-
ers'Free Speech Rights in the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413 (2002).
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been described 250 as having many faces in the circuit courts of ap-
peals. 251 In this section, I briefly point out various examples of
subject matter that have been found by various federal courts to
constitute "matters of public concern."
In a case where the teacher's speech took the form of several ar-
ticles written to various newspapers alleging the school board's
mismanagement of taxpayer funds, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) public requests for salaries and travel expenses of board
members, and distribution of questionnaires to her colleagues
about how teachers are treated or not treated as professionals by
the school district, the Fourth Circuit held that the teacher's
speech involved substantial matters of public concern.252
Speech expressing concern about lack of responsiveness to stu-
dents' needs and that of the community has been recognized as
speech about a matter of public concern. 253 Speech about salaries
and other employment benefits has also been found to constitute a
matter of public concern. 254 In addition, speech about maternity
leave has been specifically held to be a matter of public concern. 255
It has also been determined that when teachers speak out about
factors interfering with the education of students, their speech is
on a matter of public concern.256
A memorandum criticizing the employee's immediate supervisor
for unprofessional conduct and use of various epithets has been
held to be of public concern; 257 criticism of the superintendent at a
public meeting for lack of professionalism and for the transfer of a
250. See D. Gordon Smith, Beyond "Public Concern'" New Free Speech Standards for
Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 257-58 (1990).
251. Sharp v. Lindsey, 285 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2002). In fact, faced with the confusion
surrounding the Connick test for matter of public concern and its application, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated "application of the Connick test can be difficult. In the case
before us, happily, the nettle is one we need not grasp." Id. at 485 (emphasis added). Con-
tinuing on an assumption without further ferreting out the intricacies of the Connick test,
the circuit court added: "[pretermitting this particular issue [of whether plaintiffs speech
constituted a matter of public concern under the Connick test], we shall assume for pur-
poses of analysis, without so deciding," that the plaintiffs speech constituted speech on a
matter of public concern. Id.
252. Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1994).
253. Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1982).
254. See, e.g., Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1978); see generally Hanson
v. Hoffman, 628 F.2d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1980); McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.
255. See generally Hanson, 628 F.2d at 50.
256. See, e.g., Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1977); Daulton, 678 F.2d
487.
257. See Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd, 734 F.2d 1321
(8th Cir. 1984).
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teacher constitutes a matter of public concern. 258 A teacher's let-
ter asking for the investigation of a principal for harassing and
intimidating her and interfering with her classroom performance
constitutes a matter of public concern. 259 Likewise, a matter of
public concern is involved when a public employee writes to the
Attorney General requesting the investigation of events within the
department.260 Advocacy of a method for use in determining
whether racial equity exists in a school district and submission of
equity report has been held to constitute a matter of public con-
cern. 2
6 1
Speech at a public meeting accusing a state agency of ineffi-
ciency, waste, and fraud constitutes speech on a matter of signifi-
cant public concern; 262 so does speech critical of a school district's
medication policy which permitted nurses, with only parental
permission, to give prescription and nonprescription drugs to stu-
dents. 263 "[Glenerally, speech by a public school employee about a
policy or practice which can substantially and detrimentally affect
the welfare of the children attending the school constitutes speech
on a matter of public concern."
264
Other examples of a "matter of public concern" include: a
teacher's letter to a school board about the district's athletic pro-
gram, where the program had become a matter of public debate;
265
comments to parents about a school coach's inappropriate use of
corporal punishment; 266 a letter to a newspaper about a school
board's decision to get rid of junior high track; 267 statements about
the quality of education with respect to achievement test scores
and students' yearly academic deterioration;268 statements about a
principal's publication of false student test scores; 269 statements
about a principal's misrepresentation of student achievements; 270
258. Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1986).
259. See Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085
(1987).
260. See Wulfv. Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 (10th Cir. 1989).
261. Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 1998).
262. Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1983).
263. Johnsen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3 of Tulsa County, Okla., 891 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.
1989).
264. Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 906 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (10th Cir. 1990).
265. Anderson v. Cent. Point Sch. Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984).
266. Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1983).
267. McGee v. S. Pemiscot Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1983).
268. Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325 (2d Cir. 1996).




statements about the administration of the educational process; 271
speech about racially discriminatory policies and practices; 272
communication about inequitable mileage allowances; 273 state-
ments about the inadequacy of the liability insurance provided by
school district to coaches and parent volunteers who transport
students to school events; 274 speech about the impact of the failure
to have programs specifically for emotionally and behaviorally im-
paired students;275 revelations of a special education director's
threats to overrule the consensus of teams of teachers, social
workers, and other professionals about the placement of students
in violation of law; 276 disclosures of sexual misconduct against stu-
dents to the Department of Children and Family Services; 277
speech about school placement of special education students in
violation of state and federal regulations; 278 statements to a re-
porter about a supervisor "holding himself out as a doctor when he
did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree";279 and statements
concerning potential dangers to the community's citizens. 28 0
The following have also been found to constitute "matters of
public concern": statements about mismanagement of public
funds;281 statements about favoritism in grading athletes; 282
speech about exchange of grades for sex; 28 3 speech about the inef-
ficiencies in a school's implementation of the Right to Read pro-
gram-a federally funded program to fight illiteracy; 284 speech
about failures to notify parents about educational planning meet-
ings which they have a right to attend under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA);285 speech about predetermina-
tions of the classifications of certain children prior to a diagnostic
271. Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. Schs., 773 F.2d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 1985).
272. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468
U.S. 1204 (1984).
273. Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 840 (7th Cir. 1985).
274. Knapp, 757 F.2d at 841.
275. Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 1995).
276. Wytrwal, 70 F.3d at 170.
277. Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 17 F.3d 1059, 1067
(7th Cir. 1994).
278. Wytrwal, 70 F.3d at 171.
279. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812 (10th Cir. 1996).
280. Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1995).
281. Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398, 1403 (8th Cir. 1987).
282. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821 (1990).
283. Coats, 890 F.2d at 732.
284. Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed,
473 U.S. 901 (1985).
285. Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1997).
170 Vol. 46
Pickering in the Federal Circuits
team's input, in contravention of the IDEA; 28 6 statements about
the change of special education students' placements and services
without diagnostic team input or parental notification, in contra-
vention of the IDEA;28 7 statements about disregarding individual-
ized educational programs (IEP) of special education children, in
violation of the IDEA;28 8 speech about illegal use of retirement
funds to balance a budget;28 9 speech about the implementation of
a reduction-in-force plan and the overly subjective procedures in
the implementation process; 290 statements about the "integrity,
qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public
official";291 speech endorsing or opposing candidates in an electoral
process; 292 statements advocating the legalization of marijuana;
293
speech criticizing national drug control policy;294 and speech de-
bating civil disobedience. 2
95
According to the Fourth Circuit: "a complaint published in a
school newspaper that a public school discriminates on the basis of
sex raises a question of public concern." 296 Also, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that speech about "educational improvement and
fiscal responsibility in public schools clearly are matters of public
concern. ' 297 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the
"subjects of student discipline and the appropriate educational
program to be implemented are undoubtedly matters of concern to
the community at large. 298
In McKinley v. City of Eloy, 299 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that "speech [which] dealt with the rate of compensa-
tion for members of the city's police force and, more generally,
with the working relationship between the police union and
286. Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1016.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1992).
290. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 814.
291. Id. at 812.
292. Id.; Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992).
293. Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994).
294. Blum, 18 F.3d at 1012.
295. Id. Note that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that speech about the
'legalization of marijuana, criticizing national drug control policy, and debating civil dis-
obedience on its face implicates matters of public concern .. . [because] the abuse of and
traffic in controlled substances is a major societal problem." Id. (emphasis added). It is
unclear whether this reference to "on its face" is a determination of substantial matters of
public concern or inherent matters of public concern.
296. Muller v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 878 F.2d 1578, 1583 (4th Cir. 1989).
297. Klug v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., 197 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1999).
298. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000).
299. 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
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elected city officials" 300 involved substantial matters of public con-
cern. 301 The Fourth Circuit has found speech about an employer's
widespread discriminatory policies and practices to constitute
speech on substantial matters of public concern. 302 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has found that speech about industrial hemp, made as part of
public debate, is speech involving substantial matters of public
concern. 30 3 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has held that speech
involves substantial matters of public concern "[w]hen an em-
ployee speaks out about actual wrongdoing or breach of public
trust on the part of her superiors";30 4 the Sixth Circuit agrees. 30 5
IV. ARTICULATING THE CURRENT PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-FREE
SPEECH FRAMEWORK CONSISTENTLY WITH PICKERING AND ITS
PROGENY
What has been lost in the approaches of the various circuit
courts of appeals is a clear and consistent articulation of the steps
for employees and employers involved in a First Amendment re-
taliation whistleblowing case. 306 The United States Supreme
Court articulated the applicable framework within which courts
must analyze First Amendment retaliation cases in Mount
Healthy.30 7 As previously stated, the framework consists of the
following:
1. The initial burden of proof is on the employee to show that:
(a) his or her conduct is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments; 308 and (b) the conduct was "a substantial factor" or
a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision to terminate or not
rehire him or her (or retaliate against the employee). 30 9 If the
employee is unable to carry this burden, the case is to be resolved
in favor of the employer.310
2. After the employee successfully carries the burden of proof,
the employer must then show by a preponderance of the evidence
300. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.
301. Id.
302. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 779 (4th Cir. 2004).
303. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001).
304. Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1018.
305. Leary, 228 F.3d at 737.
306. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "Pickering is fuzzy at best regarding
how the balancing of interests is to be done." Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1014.
307. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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that it would have reached the same decision about the employee's
termination or nonrenewal (or other alleged retaliatory act) had
the employee not engaged in the protected speech. 311 This is the
"same decision anyway" defense.
As the Eleventh Circuit points out: "[t]he question of whether
the employee's speech is constitutionally protected is a different
issue from the ultimate question of whether the employer has vio-
lated the employee's right of freedom of speech." 312 Thus, these
two legal questions must be treated as distinct. In other words,
even though speech is constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment, retaliatory acts might be constitutionally permissible
against such protected speech, making the employer not liable for
the alleged retaliatory acts. Working within this Mount Healthy
framework and working pursuant to the language of Pickering is
very important. In doing so, it is important to literally work from
left to right within the very language of the Pickering balancing
test and to be aware that the cases in the United States Supreme
Court's public employment-free speech jurisprudence since
Pickering have interpreted or elaborated on aspects of the
Pickering balancing test. Significantly, the language of the
Pickering balancing test provides that "[t]he problem in any case
is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." 313
Keeping all these points in mind, pursuant to Mount Healthy,
employees who come to court alleging retaliation for speech must
first show that the speech is protected. An examination of
Pickering and its progeny reveals that the complete framework is
thus:
1. The initial burden of proof is on the employee to show that:
(a) his or her conduct is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
To prove this, the employee has to show, pursuant to Pickering,
that:
(i) the employee is a "public employee";
(ii) the employee suffered an "adverse government action";31 4
311. Id.
312. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986).
313. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
314. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1999).
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(iii) the employee's conduct constituted "speech" under the
First Amendment;
(iv) the employee spoke "as a citizen," and not merely as an
employee (the Garcetti test);
(v) the employee's speech was on a "matter of public concern"
(pursuant to the Connick test of content, form, and context);
and
(vi) the employee has "interests in commenting" on matters of
public concern.
(b) the employee's speech was "a substantial factor" or a "moti-
vating factor" in the employer's decision to terminate or not re-
hire him or her.
If the employee is unable to carry this burden, the case is to be
resolved in favor of the employer.
All of the steps listed in (1) (a) and (b) above determine whether
the employee has a prima facie case that speech is constitutionally
protected. If the employee carries the burden and thus establishes
a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer portion
of the Pickering balancing test. The employer must prove:
2. (a) "employer status";315
(b) the "same decision anyway" defense;
316
(c) the existence of "operational efficiency concerns"; 31 7 and
(d) that operational efficiency concerns outweigh interests of
the employee in commenting as a citizen on matters of pub-
lic concern. 318
The employer should also rebut (if applicable) any of the em-
ployee's proof under 1 (a) and (b) above. Similarly, the employee
has a chance to rebut any of the employer's steps 2 (a) through (d)
proof. Steps 2 (a) through (d) would help the court in determining
315. The employer might have to show that it acted in its role as employer toward the
employee and not merely as government. In other words, the relationship with respect to
the plaintiff is a public employer-public employee relationship, as opposed to a government-
citizen relationship. In Pickering and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the status of a public employer as an employer (as opposed to its status as sover-
eign when dealing with the general citizenry) makes it imperative that public employers
have some control over their employees' speech.
316. The employer has to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision about the employee's termination or nonrenewal (or other al-
leged retaliatory act) had the employee not engaged in the protected speech.
317. The employer should then argue, pursuant to the Pickering calculus factors, that it
has an interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. The employer could rely on the Pickering calculus factors in making
this argument.
318. The employer should also show that its operational efficiency concerns outweigh the
interest of the employee in commenting as a citizen on matters of public concern.
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whether the employer has violated the employee's protected
speech.
319
As noted earlier, "the extent of protection afforded by the first
amendment to expression is ultimately a question of law for the
courts, but... the jury's function is to find the underlying facts to
which the legal standard is ultimately applied." 320 Step 1(b) above
is also a question of fact for the fact finder. 321 The court weighs all
the evidence and in so doing, the court then balances, within the
Pickering balancing test, the interest of the employee in speech on
matters of public concern against the interest of the employer in
operational efficiency. The result of this entire process would be
the determination as to whether the employer who has violated
the employee's constitutionally protected speech is liable.
319. See generally Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1508; Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 755
F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
320. Kim v. Coppin State Coll., 662 F.2d 1055, 1062 (4th Cir. 1981). See also Connick,
461 U.S. at 148; Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1984); McGee v. S. Pemiscot
Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1983).
321. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Figure 2: Diagrammatic Representation of Aspects of the Matter
of Public Concern:
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